security: CAPA privilege escalation, CSV injection, AI rate-limit, prompt injection guard, open redirect, timing-safe cron secret, server-only admin client, notifications RLS

app/api/capa/[id]/route.ts

@@ -36,7 +36,17 @@ export async function PATCH(
   const { data: { user }, error: authError } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
   if (authError || !user) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
 
+  const { data: profile } = await supabase.from('users').select('role').eq('id', user.id).single()
+  const role = profile?.role ?? ''
+
   const body = await request.json()
+
+  // Only hse/admin can set privileged statuses — owner can only move to in_progress/pending_verification
+  const privilegedStatuses = ['verified', 'reopened', 'closed']
+  if (body.status && privilegedStatuses.includes(body.status) && !['hse', 'admin'].includes(role)) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Forbidden' }, { status: 403 })
+  }
+
   const allowed = ['description', 'due_date', 'priority', 'status', 'department', 'root_cause_ref']
   const update: Record<string, unknown> = {}
   for (const key of allowed) {

app/api/cron/capa-escalation/route.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic'
 
+import { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto'
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server'
 import { createClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
 import { escalateOverdueCapa } from '@/lib/notifications/capa-escalation'
 
 export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
-  const auth = request.headers.get('authorization')
+  const auth = request.headers.get('authorization') ?? ''
-  const expected = `Bearer ${process.env.CRON_SECRET}`
+  const expected = `Bearer ${process.env.CRON_SECRET ?? ''}`
-  if (!auth || auth !== expected) {
+  const authBuf = Buffer.from(auth, 'utf8')
+  const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expected, 'utf8')
+  const valid = authBuf.length === expectedBuf.length && timingSafeEqual(authBuf, expectedBuf)
+  if (!valid) {
     return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
   }
 

app/api/dashboard/ai/risk-flags/route.ts

@@ -78,6 +78,20 @@ export async function POST() {
     second_half: a.second_half,
   }))
 
+  // Rate limit: 1 AI call per 60s per user (checked via audit_log)
+  const { data: lastCall } = await supabase
+    .from('audit_log')
+    .select('changed_at')
+    .eq('changed_by', user.id)
+    .eq('action', 'ai_risk_flags')
+    .order('changed_at', { ascending: false })
+    .limit(1)
+    .single()
+
+  if (lastCall && Date.now() - new Date(lastCall.changed_at).getTime() < 60_000) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Rate limit: wait 60 seconds between AI requests' }, { status: 429 })
+  }
+
   const anthropicKey = await getApiKey(supabase, 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY')
   const anthropic = createAnthropicClient(anthropicKey)
 
@@ -119,7 +133,9 @@ export async function POST() {
 
 Flag zones with rising or elevated risk (at most 5 flags; do not flag healthy zones). Base every rationale strictly on the numbers given.
 
-${JSON.stringify(aggregates, null, 2)}`,
+<zone_data>
+${JSON.stringify(aggregates, null, 2)}
+</zone_data>`,
       }],
     })
   } catch {

lib/csv.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 export function escapeCsv(value: string | number | null | undefined): string {
   if (value === null || value === undefined) return ''
-  const str = String(value)
+  let str = String(value)
+  // Prevent CSV formula injection (Excel/LibreOffice execute cells starting with these chars)
+  if (/^[=+\-@\t\r]/.test(str)) str = "'" + str
   if (str.includes(',') || str.includes('"') || str.includes('\n')) {
     return `"${str.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`
   }

lib/supabase/admin.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import 'server-only'
 import { createClient as createSupabaseClient, type SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
 
 // Service-role client — bypasses RLS. Server-side only, and only for operations

middleware.ts

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ export async function middleware(request: NextRequest) {
 
   if (user && (pathname === '/' || pathname === '/login')) {
     const redirect = request.nextUrl.searchParams.get('redirect')
-    if (redirect && redirect.startsWith('/')) {
+    if (redirect && redirect.startsWith('/') && !redirect.startsWith('//')) {
       const url = request.nextUrl.clone()
       url.pathname = redirect
       url.search = ''

supabase/migrations/20260712000019_fix_notifications_rls.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+-- Fix: notifications_log RLS was allowing any hse/admin to read ALL notifications.
+-- Replace with per-user policy (everyone reads own) + admin-only policy for oversight.
+
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "notifications_read_elevated" ON notifications_log;
+
+CREATE POLICY "notifications_read_own" ON notifications_log
+  FOR SELECT USING (recipient_user_id = auth.uid());
+
+CREATE POLICY "notifications_read_admin" ON notifications_log
+  FOR SELECT USING (auth_user_role() = 'admin');